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ABSTRACT 
The results of previous research on the relationship between organizational performance and 
CEO turnover have been inconsistent so far. It has shown that the lower the performance, the 
greater the likelihood of CEO turnover. This negative relationship has been found in many 
subjects in organization. On the other hand, some studies found a positive relationship 
between job performance and turnover (in which the higher the performance, the greater the 
likelihood of turnover). Using a measurement of longitudinal design, this research tested 
organizational performance, such as stock and financial performance of top management 
turnover among 129 target and non-acquired firms over a five-year period.  This study found 
significant relationships between them. The results indicated that poor organization 
performance triggered CEO turnover in Indonesia, especially in merger firms. This result 
also have an implication for Indonesian business such how organizational performance can 
affect a merger or an acquisition and, as a straight forward, it also affects the management of 
an acquired company. 
 
Key words: CEO Turnover, Accounting Theory, Organizational Theory, Organizational    
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INTRODUCTION 
Organizational performance is assumed to 
determine a standard measurement of either 
successful or unsuccessful top managers 
within an organization. Consequently, it is 
often used as a measurement of institutional 
reward and punishment. Many studies 
examining the organizational performance 
factors are associated with CEO’s own 
intention to resign; yet, several are also 
indirectly associated with timely turnover 
and they are supposedly to occur in the 
organization. Some of the studies indicate 
that poor performance of the organization 
becomes the factor causing CEO turnover, 
while others looking it otherwise where 
organizational perfromance is a factor that is 
influenced by CEO turnover. This paper 
discusses these two issues, in which 
organizational performance taken as a factor 
affecting CEO turnover, and otherwise, 
organizational performance as a factor being 
affected by CEO turnover as well. This study 
attempts to provide empirical contribution to 
the issues of CEO turnover occurred in 
Indonesia, as well as to test whether poor 
organizational performance is due to the 
CEO turnover in Indonesia?  
In a study carried out by DeFond and 
Hung (2004), it shows that 195 companies in 
Indonesia find 31 cases of CEO turnover (or 
16% probability of turnover). It draws the 
interest to conduct a further study to question 
whether the turnover is actually driven by 
poor organizational performance. This study 
aimed to investigate CEO turnover that 
occurred during the company mergers in 
2004 and 2005. During these years, there was 
no major external force of any kind that 
could affect the company, thus internal 
management would entirely be responsible 
for any poor organizational performance. 
Therefore, the researcher are assured to 
justify that CEO turnover decisions during 
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that time are solely due to poor 
organizational performance – not because of 
any external factors.  
There have been several studies in 
relation to the relationship between 
organizational performance and CEO 
turnover. Furtado and Karan (1990) 
attempted to review a number of publications 
that examined the relationship between 
organizational performance and CEO 
turnover. They claimed that this study has 
been conducted for more than two decades. 
Some theories predicted the existence of a 
negative relationship (Gamson and Scotch, 
1964; Salancik and Pfeffer, 1980; Salancik 
and Meindl, 1984; Tushman and Romanelli, 
1985), but empirical findings showed that the 
results still varied. For instance, changes in 
Return On Equity (ROE) produced 
significant results in a study by Allen and 
Panian (1982), and Lubatkin and Chung 
(1985), but the finding differs from those 
conducted by Robinson and Brief (1985), or 
Harrison, Torres and Kukalis (1988). Puffer 
and Weintrop (1991) stated that the 
inconsistency in those findings might be 
flawed from the failing performance 
indicators used by researchers in assessing 
the CEO turnover decision. Puffer and 
Weintrop (1991) applied three assumptions 
(1) clarity of regulation in compensation 
contract to assure that actions performed by 
the management are at the utmost interest of 
their shareholders, (2) types of organizational 
performance indicators applied in the 
compensation contract, and (3) the 
convergence between the expectations built 
by the CEO against the actual criteria and 
performance appraisal. Failures in meeting 
the expectation could bring result in rejection 
from the management.  
  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND 
HYPOTHESIS 
CEO Turnover 
CEO turnover Model (Puffer and Weintrop, 
1991), which was frequently used in previous 
studies, included three criteria of 
performance, namely: stock price 
performance, target earnings and financial 
ratios. Target earnings posses the most 
difficulties in terms of data collection, 
especially for the countries in which 
companies do not have to state Earning 
Forecast Report as an obligation. In this 
research, Puffer and Weintrop implemented 
EPS forecast surrogating the expected target 
earnings by the board of directors.  In 
category, CEO turnover is often divided into 
two types: Mandatory and Voluntary. It is a 
Mandatory when the turnover follows a 
request or agreement of the stockholders, 
while it is Voluntary when the turnover 
follows the the CEO’s own desire.  
 
Performance appraisal in CEO 
Compensation Contract 
In general, organizations perform certain 
contract with their CEO to provide 
compensation (bonus) on the basis of 
performance achieved by the CEO. This 
compensation contract often includes three 
types of bonus schemes such as (1) stock 
option plans that is based on future stock 
price, (2) performance plans that is for 
achieving target profit of the organization, 
(3) and as an additional measurement is the 
target of accounting ratios. Puffer and 
Weintrop (1991) described several 
organizational considerations in 
implementing several indicators of 
performance appraisal. Firstly, CEO 
performance appraisal by using theoretically 
conceptual contracts is an effective 
assessment. In experience, since this 
assessment is applied, there have been some 
improvements of the performance criteria 
(Holmström, 1979). Secondly, performance 
appraisal will have a motivational impact 
towards CEO’s action to consider the most 
interest of shareholders – although it would 
eventually have its own impact on CEO's 
"security" interest as well (Lambert and 
Larcker, 1985). In addition, analysis 
conducted by Holmström (1979), and 
Feltham and Xie (1994) revealed that 
multiple performance measures would 
improve the efficiency of the contract. 
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Puffer and Weintrop (1991) further 
explained that a contract often contains 
bonus schemes which are based on more than 
one performance indicator. There are at least 
two practical reasons that are derived from 
the framework of agency theory. Firstly, a 
theoretical contract model demonstrates that 
the number of performance criteria increases, 
so it makes the evaluation of CEO 
effectiveness become more optimal 
(Holmström, 1979). As each of the criteria 
included in the compensation contract can 
measure performance differently, combining 
them will help to eliminate flaws in each 
measures, thus it can provide a clearer 
assessment of CEO’s contribution on the 
performance in the organization. Secondly, it 
is to encouraging CEO to act in the utmost 
interests of shareholders and protecting 
CEO’s particular own interests. Otherwise, 
CEO may feel under a threat or exploitation 
which can lead to actions not in the 
organization's best interests (Lambert and 
Larcker, 1985).  
Agency theory would provide the best 
ground in assessing manager’s compensation 
towards one or more performance 
measurements. Thus, the managers, then, are 
motivated to maximize performance. As 
higher expected performance demands bigger 
compensation for managers, likewise the 
shareholders expect higher dividend payment 
rate, eventually both are sharing the same 
goal.  
 
Stock Price in Stock Plans. Stock plans are 
generally perceived as a long-term form of 
compensation. A CEO is expected to 
undertake actions in order to increase future 
stock price for the organization. This type of 
compensation on one hand is good for the 
organization. However, it will bring about 
risks to CEO as stock price itself is driven by 
many factors that are often uncontrollable by 
the management. Therefore, the management 
will most possibly choose a conservative 
investment strategy to maintain and protect 
their personal interests by earning better 
return for their shareholders (Lambert and 
Lacker, 1985).  
A research conducted by Boschen, 
Duru, Gordon, and Smith (2003) examined 
the long-term effects on the unexpected 
organizational performance towards CEO 
compensation. They found that an 
unexpected-but-good accounting 
performance, at first, related to CEO increase 
in payment (bonus). Yet that was only an 
initial effect which would eventually 
somehow be back at lower level of payment 
in the following years. Overally, long-term 
benefits from this unexpected-but-good 
accounting performance would have an 
insignificantly different than null. However, 
there would be far different from the stock 
price in a way that stock price performance is 
positively and significantly associated with 
the increase in bonus payment for several 
years. Then, CEO’s financial gain from the 
long-term cumulative unexpected-but-good 
stock price performance are also positive and 
significant.  
The Positive Theory Accounting (PAT) 
focuses on predicting managers’ action in 
selecting accounting policies; and on how 
managers respond to the offer of the new 
standards. For example, can we predict 
whether oil and gas organization managers 
will pick SE as its accounting policy in 
keeping record of exploration costs or will he 
choose the FC instead? Can we predict 
whether the manager to support fair value 
accounting standards as its financial 
instrument, or otherwise? PAT perceives that 
organizations organize themselves in ways it 
is the most efficient, so that they can 
maximize their existence. As a nexus of 
contracts, organization can broadly explain 
the entire contract owned by the organization 
because an organization is basically a 
compilation of (bound to) contracts. 
Furthermore, an organization will make 
efforts to minimize the cost of its various 
organization contracts. Contracts at the 
lowest cost are called the efficient contracts 
(Scott, 2006). Such contracts would be the 
main objective of any organization.  
Watt and Zimmerman (1986) 
formulated three hypotheses contained in 
PAT into (1) The bonus plan hypothesis, (2) 
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the debt covenant hypothesis, and (3) the 
political cost. The bonus plan hypothesis 
stated that managers with bonus plan prefer 
accounting procedures which report future 
earnings during the current period. Regarding 
the income statement, the manager would try 
to raise his current bonus by increasing 
income reported. The debt covenant 
hypothesis considers that an organization 
usually tries to deviate accounts from which 
they are required to make loan. While the 
political cost hypothesis explained that the 
greater the political cost faced by an 
organization, it is likely that managers prefer 
accounting procedures that report earnings 
differently from the moment until future 
period. Those hypotheses construct an 
important component in PAT. By paying 
concern to the bonus plan, managers may 
choose less conservative accounting policies, 
so it can generate better earnings.  
Scott (2006) also explained that 
Executive Compensation Plans (ECP), in 
which it included a combination of 
incentives, risks and consideration of long-
term decisions, defines the agency contract 
between the organization and its manager 
that aims to limit the interests of owner and 
manager by assessing manager’s 
compensation using one or more 
performance measures when managing the 
organization. Many compensation plans are 
based on two measures of performance, net 
income and stock price. Furthermore, the 
amount of bonuses, shares, options, as well 
as other payments to excecutives which will 
be awarded in a given year depends on the 
performance of net income and stock price.   
At the early rise in 1986, PAT was 
neutral. But then in 1990s, PAT was directed 
to meet the interests of managers. Such a 
buzz on meeting their interests is bonus plan, 
as debt covenants and political costs are more 
to the interests of the organization. This is 
between two polar of opportunistic (bonus 
plan) and efficiency (debt covenant – tend to 
raise profits, and political cost –in which for 
giant organizations, monopoly holders, and 
public utilities, tend to reduce income that is 
not preferably for managers).  
 
Target Earnings. When previous researchers 
used stock price performance measurement 
with target earnings as an indicator that will 
be associated with CEO turnover, then the 
assumptions apllied were stock prices and 
earnings contained different information that 
provide different performance indicators as 
well. Information given in earnings statement 
may distinguish the actions done by CEO 
against uncontrollable external factors as in 
the case of stock prices. Target earnings can 
help balancing the impacts upon the risks 
imposed when CEO compensation is 
measured with the stock price (Lambert and 
Lacker 1985) .   
Nevertheless, Holmstrom (1979) 
assumed that agents’ way of conduct could 
not be observed by the principal, but its 
payments could be observed simultaneously 
at the end of the period. Feltham and Xie 
(1994) showed that Holmstrom model broke 
through unobservable payment became 
possible to be observed through the course of 
constant actions performed by managers. 
Holmstrom explained that performance 
measures-based contracts, such as net income 
(earnings) are less efficient than first-best 
contract (which is stock price performance). 
However, the bonus plan which is based on 
annual earnings target has been a common 
feature on the compensation plan in America. 
In 1980, 90% of organizations of 1000 
largest U.S. manufacturing firms in the 
United States implemented such 
compensation plan (Healy 1985). Target 
Earnings-based bonus plan made up a short-
term substantial portion for executive 
compensation. For instance, in 1978 the 
mean accounting ratio of bonus to basic 
salary for senior executives was at 52 percent 
(Fox 1980).  
 
Selected Accounting Ratios. Accounting 
ratios represent measures of the 
organization’s ability to earn profit 
(profitability) and to attain efficiencies that 
are measurable by the internal and external 
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evaluators in concern of organizational health 
assessment (Weiner and Mahoney, 1981). 
Accounting ratios measurement has been 
tested empirically and widely applied in 
previous research. They are Return on assets 
(Virany, Tushman and Romanelli 1985; 
Harrison, Torres, and Kukalis, 1988), Return 
on equity (James and Soref, 1981; Allen and 
Panian, 1982; Lubatkin and Chung, 1985; 
Robinson and Brief, 1985; Harrison , Torres, 
and Kukalis, 1988) and the profit margin on 
sales (Slancik and Pfeffer, 1980; Harrison, 
Torres, and Kukalis, 1988). Accounting 
ratios are less frequently applied compared to 
the stock price and target earnings.   
Boschen et al. (2003), which tested the 
long-term effects on the unexpected 
performance of the organization towards 
CEO compensation, found that good 
(unexpected) accounting performance in fact 
did not contribute to better long-term 
cummulative gain for the CEO of the 
organization. An expectation that there are 
positive and significant relationship between 
accounting performance and CEO 
compensation were not found in their study.  
 
Underperformed Organization Causes the 
CEO Turnover 
Underperformed Stock Prices Forces CEO 
Turnover. This research noted that CEO 
turnover followed stock price drop and lower 
earnings performance (Coughlan and 
Schmidt, 1985; Warner, et al., 1988; 
Weisbach , 1988). Thus, it drew the 
conslusion that CEO turnover most likely 
due to poor performance. Murphy and 
Zimmerman (1993) found no evidence of any 
managerial policy to have caused such CEO 
turnover in an organization. In the opposite, 
underperformed CEO did not strongly 
associated with CEO turnover as reported in 
Germany and Japan government. 
Nevertheless, Adam's et al. (2005) found a 
positive relationship between CEO turnover 
and performance.  
Great concern among researchers in 
recent years has indeed been around the topic 
of the importance to understand the potential 
impact of performance towards employee 
turnover process, including CEO (Mobley, 
1982; Steers & Mowday, 1981). Related 
findings in Puffer and Weintrop (1991) study 
were likely inconsistent. These incon-
sistencies among previous studies about the 
relationship between corporate performance 
and CEO turnover may be due to the 
ignorance of board of directors as the 
indicator who are responsible for the CEO 
turnover decision.  
  
Hypothesis 1: The performance of stock 
price is positively associated with CEO 
turnover.  
 
Accounting Performance Engaging CEO 
Turnover. Accounting performance has been 
widely researched in recent years. Kato and 
Long (2006, 2005) examined the relationship 
between CEO turnover towards accounting 
performance in China with different scales of 
sample data in both of their two years of 
research. In 2006, they found a strong 
relationship within the companies with 
concentrated ownership. This relationship is 
consistent with the findings by Volvin (2002) 
using Italian companies as research sample. 
The same thing had previously been found in 
research by La Porta et al. (1999) as well.   
Accounting ratios represent measures 
of the organization’s ability to earn profit 
(profitability) and to attain efficiencies that 
are measurable by the internal and external 
evaluators in concern of organizational health 
assessment. As empirically tested in previous 
studies, they are Return on assets/ROA 
(Virany, Tushman and Romanelli 1985; 
Harrison, Torres, and Kukalis, 1988), return 
on equity (Soref and James, in 1981; Allen 
and Panian, 1982; Lubatkin and Chung, 
1985; Robinson and Brief, 1985; Harrison, 
Torres, and Kukalis, 1988), and the profit 
margin on Sales (Slancik and Pfeffer, in 
1980; Harrison, Torres, and Kukalis, 1988). 
Accounting ratios provide the information to 
explain accounting performance, as for better 
accounting performance decreases tendency 
of either mandatory or voluntary CEO 
resignation.  
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Boschen et al. (2003) examined the 
long-term effects on organizational 
performance (unexpected) towards CEO 
compensation. He found that good 
accounting performance (unexpected) in fact 
did not contribute to better long-term 
cummulative gain for CEO. Thus the 
proposed hypothesis is:  
  
Hypothesis 2: Accounting performance is 
positively associated with CEO turnover.  
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Research Sample and Data 
Since information on CEO turnover in 
Indonesia is likely hard to obtain, to collect 
the required data, this study will conduct a 
thorough search directly into the company's 
annual report during the year 1990 to 2004. 
The data are obtained from the Business and 
Economics Data Center, University of 
Gadjah Mada. For each company, five years 
period – prior to and after the CEO turnover 
took place – is analysed. For instance, in 
2005 CEO turnover, the stock price 
performance and accounting performance 
data used will begin with the starting year of 
2000(t-5), 2001(t-4), 2002(t-3), 2003(t-2),  2004(t-1) 
and 2000(t+1), 2001(t+2), 2002(t+3), 2003(t+4),  
2004(t+5). 
 
Research Variables 
This study employs stock price performance 
and financial performance as its independent 
variables. Referring to stock price 
performance, the annual average value is 
used by dividing the sum of the beginning 
and the end year value into two.  On the other 
hand, Profit Margin on Sales and Return On 
Assets will measure the accounting 
performance. These two variables indicating 
accounting performance are used because 
they are derived from separate financial 
statements, Profit Margin on Sales is derived 
from the income statement, while Return On 
Assets is obtained from the balance sheet. 
Therefore, at this early observation, 
multicolinearity can be avoided.  
 Econometric Model of the Research  
In assessing the probability of company’s 
decisions associated with economic activity, 
the basic economic models applied are the 
logit and probit. Andrei, Oancea, Stancu and 
Iacon (2009), in their research which 
employed a binary model, recommended the 
use of those models for a decision over two 
given activities. In their study, the activities 
are whether to buy or not to buy a product, as 
in the following.  
 
Y= 
1, to-buy activity 
0, not-to-buy activity 
 
The equation below is to explain that β 
is the vector coefficients to be 
estimated.  
 
 
Data of this study are cross sectional and will 
be tested using logit model, a model that 
aims to linearize the probit model. This 
model is similar to research conducted by 
Cramer (2007) which aims to observe the 
variation of outcome Y that may be 
associated with a number of covariates Xj. In 
accounting research, Zhou, Xiong and 
Garguli (2009) also employed a binary model 
when they applied adopt IFRS and non-adopt 
IFRS as dependent variables which they 
symbolized by ADOPT (1.0). Logit analysis 
was used to test their independent and 
dependent variables. Then, logit analysis 
became an important part in the analysis of 
strategic studies for the past few years in 
order to maintain the strength of 
methodology in high-standard journals. In his 
research in strategic management, Hoetker 
(2007) employed this logit model as well. 
 
Below is the research model for hypotheses 1 
and 2i, 
 
TURNOVER (1,0)= α0 + α1 KjSHMit + α2 
ROAit +α3 ProMARit + εit 
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Where: 
TURNOVER (1,0): indicator variable at 
which 1=no turnover and 0=turnover.  
KjSHM: performance of stock prices, 
obtained from deducting stock price at t with 
stock price at t-1 and dividing by the stock 
price at t-1 (equal the value of the stock 
return).  
ROA: Return on Assets, obtained from 
dividing earning after tax by the total assets. 
ProMAR: Profit margin, obtained from 
dividing net profit margin by the total sales. 
 
Of the variables above, the linear probability 
model can be described as follows: 
 
 where εi is the residual 
variable that measures the influence of other 
factors that might contribute to explain the 
CEO turnover.  
 
As a basis for estimating the value of the 
assessed variables above, the estimation 
parameter of its linear probability model is,  
 
 
Andrei et al. (2009) defined LOGIT model in 
a way that repartition function which 
explains the probability of pi = P(yi = 1) 
refers to the type of logistic below, 
 
 
 
As for the repartition function alone is 
described below, 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 1 
CEO Turnover Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Accounting 
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ROA 
Profit Margin 
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Referring to its endogenous variables, this 
model uses the code 1 and 0, thus the R2 
result from the logit model cannot be 
analysed or interpreted. Furthermore, since 
the logit model is one type of non-linear test, 
the test is intended for the purpose of sign 
test rather than test of significance.  
 
DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
The results obtained from the binary test 
enclosed in the appendix revealed that an 
outcome is onsistent with the theoretical 
ground used in this research. In addition, the 
three variables tested were all significant.   
Stock price performance symbolized 
with X1 in Table Binary Test Results showed 
positive coefficient value (0.3384) with 
significance value at 0.0073. This value 
indicates that there is a positive relationship 
between stock performance and CEO 
turnover in Indonesia. With a justification 
that if the stock performance increases, then 
CEO turnover will not occur; and vice versa. 
In the case of voluntary turnover, it is 
possible that indications as described in the 
bonus plan theory will logically occur, as a 
stock performance-driven CEO would resign 
if the bonus significantly and systematically 
decreases. Mandatory CEO turnover is 
generally in demand from stockholders who 
have lost trust in the ability that their CEO 
will prosper them. These results indicate that 
the first hypothesis is supported by statistical 
proof as the stock price performance is 
positively related to CEO turnover.  
Return on Assets (ROA) symbolized 
with X2 in Table Binary Test results showed 
positive coefficient value of 1.0231 with 
significance at 0.000, which means that ROA 
has a positive relationship towards CEO 
turnover in Indonesia. With a justification 
that good ROA performance will not result in 
CEO turnover in the company; and vice versa 
as well. ROA is a ratio that measures a 
company's ability to generate profits by 
optimizing the use of corporate assets. It is 
very interesting to have such consistency 
between CEO turnover and ROA 
performance.   
These findings are consistent with 
those found in previous researches which 
support the positive and significant 
relationship between ROA and CEO turnover 
(e.g. Virany, Tushman & Romanelli, 1985; 
Harrison, Torres, and Kukalis, 1988). These 
results indicate that the better the 
organizational performance, the less likely 
CEO will turnover.  
In the third test, accounting 
performance is examined by analysing Profit 
Margin on Sales (symbolized with X3). It is 
predicted that the test will have a positive 
relationship towards CEO turnover. From the 
binary test results, it is shown that the 
positive coefficient is at 0.6586 with 
significance value at 0.0016. This result also 
proves that the profit margin on sales has a 
positive relationship towards CEO turnover 
in Indonesia. Furthermore, we can justify as 
well that good profit margin on sales gives an 
indication to the least chance that CEO 
turnover will happen – particularly in 
mandatory turnover case – vice versa. Binary 
test results for X2 and X3 in this study 
indicate that the second hypothesis of this 
study are statistically well supported, that 
accounting performance is proven positively 
associated with CEO turnover.  
The results of this analysis support 
those of previous studies conducted by 
Slancik and Pfeffer, 1980; and Harrison, 
Torres, and Kukalis, 1988. These findings 
also state that accounting data can be used to 
predict the possibilities of CEO turnover in 
Indonesia. And the three independent 
variables employed in this study reinforce the 
contribution of this research for businesses in 
Indonesia, that accounting information has 
the power to explain phenomenon of CEO 
turnover, in particular for companies during 
merger.  
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Table 1 
Binary Test Results 
 Coefficient Standard of 
Deviation 
Z-statistic Probability 
X1 0.338471 0.126234 2.681305 0.0073
X2 1.013133 0.139187 7.278957 0.0000
X3 0.658657 0.208595 3.157585 0.0016
C -8.112302 0.244672 -33.15585 0.0000
 
This analysis is consistent with the theory of 
rationality Schein (1992) which states that 
the change agent is a warning to identify and 
remove barriers from the change in goal to 
transform the organization into a better 
(Smith, Wright, and Huo 2008). This 
indicates that the theory is in deteriorating 
condition of organizational performance, top 
management turnover will terjadisalah only 
in form of mergers and acquisitions.  
 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION  
This study attempts to provide an empirical 
contribution to CEO turnover phenomenon in 
Indonesia. CEO turnover is originally driven 
by many factors, and this study found that 
stock performance and accounting 
performance which are represented by ROA 
and profit margin on sales are proved 
positively associated with CEO turnover in 
Indonesia. The issue made up this research is 
resolved, that CEO turnover in Indonesia was 
driven by poor organizational performance. 
The results are consistent with the Bonus 
Plan Theory within Positive Accounting 
Theory. The latter analysis we did on the 
research results showed that poor stock 
performance and low accounting 
performance triggered several companies to 
conduct mergers.  
For further research, it is suggested to 
perform in-depth studies to find companies 
that really do turnover their CEO. Extra 
efforts will be required as such CEO turnover 
data is rather hard to obtain, however, by 
doing so it won’t require to use surrogating 
variables which will produce more actual 
research results. In addition, it would be 
interesting to consider the characteristics of 
each CEO of each company that are about to 
turnover, such as the relevance with 
education background, years of service or 
experience as CEO, and nationality (native or 
foreign).  
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APPENDIX – LOGIT Analysis Result 
 
Dependent Variable: Y   
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Date: 12/10/09   Time: 09:07   
Sample: 1 129   
Included observations: 129   
Convergence not achieved after 1 iteration  
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance 
 
Coefficien
t Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
X1 0.338471 0.126234 2.681305 0.0073
X2 1.013133 0.139187 7.278957 0.0000
X3 0.658657 0.208595 3.157585 0.0016
C -8.112302 0.244672 -33.15585 0.0000
McFadden R-squared 0.885328     Mean dependent var 0.581395
S.D. dependent var 0.495254     S.E. of regression 0.114785
Akaike info criterion 0.217932    Sum squared resid 1.646946
Schwarz criterion 0.306609     Log likelihood -10.05664
Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.253963    Restr. log likelihood -87.69905
LR statistic 155.2848     Avg. log likelihood -0.077958
Prob(LR statistic) 0.000000    
Obs with Dep=0 54      Total obs 129
Obs with Dep=1 75    
 
